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LETTERS
The 3 patients infected with W135 
in our study did not receive biva-
lent meningococcal vaccines. W135 
meningococcal disease appears to be 
an emerging problem that should be 
investigated epidemiologically. These 
patients highlight the need for further 
epidemiologic surveillance to monitor 
changes in the incidence of meningo-
coccal disease caused by W135 and 
for improved public health disease 
control strategies in the future.
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Avian Inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) Outbreak 
among Wild Birds, 
Russia, 2009
To the Editor: Highly patho-
genic avian inﬂ   uenza (HPAI) virus 
(H5N1) has been endemic in poultry 
in Southeast Asia since 2003 (1). In 
April 2005, an outbreak of inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1) infection was detected 
in wild birds on Qinghai Lake in 
western China (2). Subsequently, the 
Qinghai-like (clade 2.2) HPAI virus 
(H5N1) lineage was detected in wild 
birds and poultry in many countries 
(1,3,4). The source of these introduc-
tions, although still debated, is likely 
through bird migration (5).
In June 2006, an inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
outbreak was detected in wild birds 
on Uvs-Nuur Lake in western Sibe-
ria, Russia. We showed that A/duck/
Tuva/01/2006, isolated during the 
outbreak, was highly pathogenic for 
chickens and mice and belonged to the 
Qinghai-like group (2.2 clade) (6).
The ﬁ  rst case of Fujian subclade 
2.3.2 inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) lineage 
in the Russian Far East was recorded 
in April 2008 (7). Before this case, no 
HPAI (H5N1) outbreaks of the Fujian 
lineage had been reported in Russia.
In June 2009, an outbreak of HPAI 
in wild birds was recorded in Mongo-
lia (4) and on Uvs-Nuur Lake in Rus-
sia. RNA extracted from organs (liver, 
spleen, intestine) of 10 dead birds 
belonging to 4 species (great crested 
grebe [Podiceps cristatus], little grebe 
[Tachybaptus ruﬁ  collis], black-headed 
gull [Larus ridibundus], and spoon-
bill [Platalea leucorodia]) was posi-
tive for type A inﬂ  uenza RNA and for 
the H5 subtype by real-time reverse 
transcription–PCR (8). We isolated 
2 viruses from embryonated speciﬁ  c 
antibody–negative fowl eggs. Hemag-
glutination (HA) and neuraminidase 
(NA) inhibition assays with monospe-
ciﬁ  c antiserum conﬁ  rmed the H5N1 
subtype. Viruses were designated as A/
black-headed gull/Tyva/115/2009 and 
A/great crested grebe/Tyva/120/2009, 
and sequences of their HA and NA 
segments were deﬁ   ned. No HPAI 
virus (H5N1) was found in cloacal 
swabs obtained from 36 live birds (of 
the 4 species listed above) from Uvs-
Nuur Lake.
Phylogenetic analysis (9) of the 
HA gene (Figure) showed that vi-
ruses belong to clade 2.3.2. These 
viruses are clearly distinguishable 
from the HPAI viruses previously iso-
lated in this Russian region in 2006, 
A/duck/Tuva/01/2006 (clade 2.2) but 
are more related to A/whooper swan/
Mongolia/8/2009 and A/whooper 
swan/Mongolia/2/2009. For the NA 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 2, February 2010  349 LETTERS
gene, isolated viruses were most close-
ly related to viruses found in Mongo-
lia. Analysis of NA protein determined 
that the viruses found are sensitive to 
NA inhibitors.
Both viruses were shown to be 
highly pathogenic for chickens (intra-
venous pathogenicity index 3). This 
ﬁ  nding is consistent with the results of 
the sequence analysis of the HA gene. 
The HA protein possesses a series of 
basic amino acids (PQRERRRKR) at 
the cleavage site. Several amino acid 
changes were found between HA of 
investigated viruses and viruses from 
clade 2.3.2 that were isolated in Russia 
in 2008. However, the receptor-bind-
ing site of HA (positions 222–224) 
was not changed.
The spread of HPAI (H5N1) west 
across the globe has caused serious 
debates on the roles of migratory birds 
in virus circulation (2,5,7). In the 2009 
outbreak we describe, we doubt that 
wild birds were infected from local 
poultry because domestic poultry are 
not present in the Uvs-Nuur Lake re-
gion and there have been no reports of 
HPAI among poultry in Russia since 
early 2008. We suggest that wild birds 
brought the virus to Uvs-Nuur Lake 
from outside the country. Because 
prior to June 2009 the only case of 
new Fujian sub-clade 2.3.2 inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1) lineage was in the Rus-
sian Far East, we believe that the virus 
isolated in 2009 from Uvs-Nuur Lake 
was probably introduced by wild birds 
that wintered in Southeast Asia.
Many different bird species stop at 
Uvs-Nuur Lake during the spring and 
fall migrations. Qinghai-like viruses 
were introduced to the region from 
central China by wild birds in 2006 (6). 
The introduction of the H5N1 Fujian-
lineage to the lake 3 years later shows 
further evidence that Uvs-Nuur Lake is 
an major area for wild bird migration 
and breeding and hence an environ-
ment that could potentially support the 
introduction of inﬂ   uenza virus vari-
ants from migrating wild birds. Bod-
ies of water such as Qinghai Lake and 
Uvs-Nuur Lake may play a major role 
in the circulation of avian inﬂ  uenza.   
Therefore, we continue to study new 
outbreaks thoroughly and take into ac-
count the ecology and pathobiology of 
the species involved. Areas where large 
numbers of birds congregate should be 
closely monitored because these areas 
could serve as the breeding ground 
for avian inﬂ  uenza virus variants that 
might spread globally. Additionally, we 
must keep in mind that wild bird spe-
cies can vary greatly in their response 
to HPAI and that naturally resistant wa-
terfowl could serve as vectors for the 
introduction of HPAI into new loca-
tions (1,2,5,7).
Because wild birds can be in-
volved in virus introduction, continu-
ing surveillance is warranted. Detec-
tion of any inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) virus 
in wild birds in a new region should be 
immediately followed up with efforts 
to characterize the virus and to control 
the spread of new HPAI viruses.
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Figure. Phylogenetic tree constructed by neighbor-joining analysis (no. replications ×600) 
of the hemagglutinin gene segment of representative inﬂ   uenza virus (H5N1) isolates. 
Taxon names of the viruses isolated in Russia in 2006 and 2009 are in boldface. Scale bar 
indicates genetic distance.LETTERS
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Detection of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Virus in 
Patients Treated 
with Oseltamivir
To the Editor: In April 2009, an 
inﬂ  uenza outbreak caused by a novel 
strain of inﬂ  uenza virus A (H1N1) was 
identiﬁ  ed in Mexico. The rapid spread 
of this new virus among humans led the 
World Health Organization to raise the 
phase of pandemic alert to 6. We report 
results from the 2 virology laboratories 
from university hospitals that were in-
volved in the surveillance network of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Paris at the 
beginning of the outbreak in France.
Patients exhibiting inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness (i.e., fever, sore throat, cough, 
asthenia, headache, myalgia) and who 
recently had traveled to countries 
where the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
outbreak had started (i.e., Mexico, 
United States, Canada, Japan) were 
hospitalized. Symptoms began either 
the day before or the day of hospital-
ization. Nasal-swab specimens were 
collected at admission by using the 
Virocult system (ELITech; Salon-
de-Provence, France), and treatment 
with oseltamivir was started (75 mg, 
2×/day). Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in-
fection was diagnosed by using rapid 
test QuickVue Inﬂ  uenza A+B (Quidel, 
San Diego, CA, USA) and real-time 
reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) 
assays from the French National In-
ﬂ  uenza Centers or the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (1). In 
the case of a positive result, inﬂ  uenza 
virus in nasal secretions from patients 
was monitored daily by RT-PCR until 
viral genomes became undetectable.
From April 24 through June 7, 
2009, nasal swab specimens from 
234 persons (132 men; median age 
of all patients 33 years) were pro-
cessed; pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infec-
tion was conﬁ  rmed for 17 men and 
15 women (median age 33 years) by 
RT-PCR. Results of the Quidel rapid 
tests were available for 27 specimens, 
with positive results for 9 (33% sen-
sitivity). However, no positive result 
was observed with the Quidel rapid 
tests among the nasal swab specimens 
with negative RT-PCR results (100% 
speciﬁ  city). Inﬂ  uenza virus detection 
in nasal secretions was monitored for 
16 patients who had laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infec-
tion and were treated with oseltamivir. 
Viral detection by RT-PCR was absent 
2 to >5 days after antiviral treatment 
began (Figure). Signiﬁ  cant differences 
were not found in sex and age of the 
patients (data not shown).
These preliminary virologic data 
obtained during the ﬁ  rst 6 weeks of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in France con-
ﬁ  rm the poor sensitivity of the Quidel 
test toward this new virus, as recent-
ly reported (2). Further studies are 
needed to evaluate the performances 
of other rapid tests. Hayden et al. (3) 
demonstrated that treatment with osel-
tamivir signiﬁ  cantly reduced duration 
of viral shedding among patients in-
fected with seasonal inﬂ  uenza virus A 
(H1N1), in comparison with a placebo 
group: 1.5–2.5 days vs. 3.5–5.5 days 
(p = 0.003). In our study, surprisingly, 
PCR results for sequential nasal swab 
specimens from 16 patients infected 
by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and treated 
with oseltamivir were negative within 
3 days after therapy for only 9 (56%); 
indeed, for 3 (19%) patients, viral ge-
nome could be detected >5 days after 
antiviral treatment began. These data 
raise questions about potential virus 
transmission during antiviral treat-
ment and the possible resistance of 
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